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LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT: THE CONTENTS
OF PANDORA'S BOX AND BEYOND
By Robert F. Eimers*
Introduction
Two decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the 1960's,
Baker v. Cart' and Reynolds v. Sims,2 announced the entrance of
the federal courts into an area which had theretofore been considered
wholly left to both the various states and other branches of govern-
ment-apportionment of state legislatures, congressional districts, and
local governing bodies. The decade saw for the first time the federal
courts taking jurisdiction of apportionment cases and announcing the
principle of "one man, one vote' 3 for the apportionment of these bod-
ies. What had been previously considered a "political"4 question and
thus left for other branches of government to decide came under the
watchful eyes of the federal judiciary. The federal courts in effect
opened Pandora's Box and entered what Justice Frankfurter had de-
scribed as the "political thicket."5
The outcome of this was that both houses of state legislatures,'
congressional districts,7 and local governing bodies8 were ordered ap-
portioned according to population.
The Supreme Court, however, has begun to allow a divergence
from this strict population standard in regard to the apportionment of
* A.B., 1971, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1974, University of Cali-
fornia, Hastings College of the Law.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. Id. at 560-61. The Court held that voting strength in legislative bodies must
be apportioned according to population.
4. For the purposes of this note, the term "political" will refer to those areas
and problems of the law in which decisions and solutions are committed to branches
of government other than the court system. See generally R. VACHON, JusTicBILM
AND THE NATURE OF JuDIcIAL OBLIGATION (1962).
5. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
7. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
8. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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local" and state legislatures,' 0 but still rigidly adheres to this standard
for congressional districts.' The Court has yet to state just how much
deviation from the population standard it will allow, and has failed
to articulate what legitimate state interests justify this departure. This
note will consider the current situation, with forecasts of the directions
the Court might take.
The Political Thicket
Historically the federal courts refused to exercise jurisdiction
in cases attacking malapportionment of congressional districts or
the legislatures or other governing bodies of the states and their politi-
cal subdivisions.1 2  The constitutions of the various states provide for
the apportionment of the legislatures of these states according to fixed
standards. In addition they provide that these bodies be reap-
portioned at fixed intervals.' 3 Generally the duty of reapportionment
is delegated to the legislature, although in a few states another offi-
cer, such as the governor, is given the task.' 4
The requirements of the various constitutions were not often fol-
lowed. Legislatures were not reapportioned for long periods, or if
they were reapportioned, it was not done in conformity with the man-
dated constitutional provisions. This often resulted in various areas
of a state being represented in the legislature with strength far greater
than their populations would command. Certain areas of a state often
came to be vastly overrepresented.' 5 Some litigation in the various
state courts occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries for the purpose of forcing the various legislatures to reapportion
according to the mandated standards. The decisions generally held
that the issue was justiciable, but that the courts could not fashion
a positive remedy.' 6
9. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
10. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
11. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
12. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). See also Wood v. Broom, 287
U.S. 1 (1932).
13. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6, and N.Y. CONST. art. III, §§ 4, 5. For
a complete list of all applicable state constitutional sections, see: ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A COMMISSION REPORT: APPORTIONMENT OF
STATE LnG IsLATUREs (1962), Appendix A.
14. E.g., the Hawaiian Constitution commits the task of reapportionment to the
Executive. HAWAH CONST. art. I, § 4.
15. Douglas, J., concurring in Baker v. Carr, stated "that a single vote in Moore
County, Tennessee, is worth 19 votes in Hamilton County, that one vote in Stewart
or in Chester County is worth nearly eight times a single vote in Shelby or Knox
County." 369 U.S. at 245 (1962).
16. R. CORTNER, THE APPORTONMENT CASES 5-8 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
CORTNEI.
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Colegrove v. Green'7 was a landmark reapportionment case. It
involved the apportionment of congressional districts in Illinois, which
at that time (1946) had both the largest and smallest congressional
districts in regard to population in the whole country.-8 A seven man
Court refused to involve the federal courts in the issue and affirmed
the decision of the lower court.19 Justice Frankfurter, joined by Jus-
tices Burton and Reed, upheld the dismissal of the suit for want of
both jurisdiction and equity. Justice Frankfurter stated that "[clourts
ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness
in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly,
or to invoke the ample powers of Congress."2  Justice Rutledge con-
curred with Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Reed, but he stated
that the complaint should be dismissed for want of equity only,
and noted that the courts should not enter so delicate an area unless
clearly compelled to do so. 2 ' Justice Black, joined by Justices Doug-
las and Murphy, felt that the Court should fashion a remedy, since
the apportionment situation in Illinois at that time denied the voters
of that state the equal protection of the law as required by the Four-
teenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. 22
Although there was no majority opinion in Colegrove v. Green2 8
a series of per curiam dismissals of reapportionment cases followed.2 4
17. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
18. CoRTNRm, supra note 16, at 15.
19. Colegrove v. Green, 64 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1946). A group of voters
had instituted suit praying that the Illinois apportionment act be declared unconstitu-
tional. The district court dismissed their suit on the sole authority of Wood v. Broom,
287 U.S. 1 (1932).
20. 328 U.S. at 556.
21. Id. at 565.
22. Id. at 566-74. While the Court refused to enter the so-called political
thicket, various earlier cases had held that the direct denial of a voting right was a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) which held the denial of the right to vote
in a primary election to a black citizen to be a denial of the equal protection clause.
Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), which held that the gerrymandering
of the boundaries of the City of Tuskagee, Alabama, with the result that most of the
black citizens in the area were excluded from voting in municipal elections, was a de-
nial of equal protection and invidious discrimination. The latter case suggests that pos-
sibly any voter's equal protection right might be violated by gerrymandering, a common
process used in apportionment. The Court has yet to squarely confront this issue, al-
though a few cases suggest that the question may ultimately be considered. See
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also G.
Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next Judicial Target? in REAPpoR-
TIoNmENT IN THE 1970s (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
23. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
24. Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) (Georgia); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S.
916 (1952) (Pennsylvania); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (Georgia); Tur-
man v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (Georgia).
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In South v. Peters,25 involving a challenge to the county unit system
of primary elections in Georgia,20 the Court stated that federal courts
would refuse to use their equity powers in cases posing political is-
sues arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral
strength.2 7  The dissent emphasized the "invidious discrimination" as-
pect2 8 of the action of the state of Georgia.29
Thus for over a century the federal courts adopted a "hands-off'
policy in regard to apportionment, although it was widely realized that
malapportionment did exist. They were afraid of the contents of Pan-
dora's Box. Justice Frankfurter had stated that both the legislatures
of the several states and Congress possesssed ample powers to deal
with the situationY' It was apparently felt that, if the voters began
to press the various legislatures or Congress, reform would be forth-
coming. If this were the hope of the Court, it was not to be realized.
Pandora's Box Opened
De Tocqueville once stated that "scarcely any political question
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into
a judicial question."'" Legislative apportionment historically had been
considered a "political"2 question; that is, the constitutions of the var-
ious states (and the federal Constitution) gave the power of apportion-
ment to either the executive or legislative branches of government and
precluded effective review by the courts. Citizens attempted to obtain
a judicial remedy for malapportionment, but were rebuffed.
A Break in the Dike
Tennessee was a state in which no reapportionment had occurred
since 1901. Because of urbanization, which brought about population
shifts, the rural areas of the state eventually held political power, and
were not going to relinquish it willingly. A voters' suit was instituted
in the Middle District of Tennessee in 1959 under the Civil Rights
25. 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
26. The county unit system allotted six unit votes to the eight most populous
Georgia counties, and two each to most of the other counties. Votes in the most pop-
ulous county allegedly had ten per cent of the voting impact of those in other counties.
Id. at 277.
27. Id. at 276-77.
28. Id. at 277-81.
29. The county unit system of primary elections in Georgia was ultimately held
to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
30. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
31. I A. DE TOcQUEVYLLE, DEMOCRACY iN AMERICA 209 (Knoph Vintage Books,
1954).
32. See note 4 supra.
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Act33 to redistrict the legislature. A three judge court relying on
Colegrove v. Green34 dismissed the suit both for want of jurisdic-
tion and because no claim had been stated upon which relief could
be granted. 5 A direct appeal was taken to the Supreme Court,386 and
one might have expected that the Court, under the hallowed doctrine
of stare decisis, would have affirmed the dismissal of the suit under
the authority of Colegrove v. Green.87  Instead the Court was per-
suaded to cast aside previous rulings.
In Baker v. Cart,38 the majority of the Court reversed the deci-
sion of the district court, holding that the petitioner's complaint stated
a cause of action, finding that the issue was justiciable, and stating
that the petitioners were entitled to a trial on the merits of the com-
plaint. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that "[tihe
mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not
mean it presents a political question."3 9  The Constitution of
the state of Tennessee stated that both houses of the legislature must
be apportioned on the basis of population and that reapportionment
must occur every ten years.40 The legislature, however, had failed
to reapportion for over fifty years. Justice Douglas, in a concurring
opinion, noted the vast differences in representation among the various
counties in Tennessee which had occurred as a result of non-
reapportionment.41 Baker v. Carr4 2 was a narrow decision and merely
announced that the petitioners had standing to sue, that the federal
court had jurisdiction, that a remedy could be fashioned, and that the
case would be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.4"
The Tennessee legislature, despite enormous pressure from var-
ious interest groups in the state, had failed to reapportion.44 On the
practical side the Court was faced with a situation for which really
no solution other than a judicial one existed. The chronicle of at-
tempts to force the Tennessee legislature to reapportion was long and
without result. In essence, the situation was "dumped into the lap
of the court". Justice Clark, in a concurring opinion, stated that the
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1970).
34. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
35. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1948).
37. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
38. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
39. Id. at 209.
40. TBNN. CONST. art. H, §§ 3-5.
41. See note 15 supra.
42. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
43. Id. at 237.
44. See generally G. GRAHAm, ONE MAN, ONE VOTE: BAxER V. CARP AND THE
AMEIuCAN LEVELLERS (1972) and CoRTNn, supra note 16,
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apportionment situation in Tennessee was a "crazy quilt without ra-
tional basis."'45
An equitable remedy appeared to be the only solution to the
problem of malapportionment. For many decades the apportionment
question was labeled "political,"'46 which precluded intervention by the
judiciary. Eventually the pressure for correction became so great that
the judiciary felt pressed to act to relieve the inequitable situation. The
question of reapportionment suddenly became a problem for the judi-
ciary, thus in effect removing it from the "political" sphere. Indeed
De Tocqueville's remarks proved to be true; a political problem be-
came a judicial one.
After the decision of Baker v. Carr,47 the Federal District Court
in Nashville, Tennessee stated that it would consider the merits of
the case and fashion a remedy, if appropriate. The case, however,
was briefly continued until an extraordinary session of the legislature
was completed. 48  The legislative districts of the state were reappor-
tioned. The lower court, although not completely satisfied with the
resulting plan, accepted it.49
One Man, One Vote
Two years later the United States Supreme Court further ven-
tured into the depths of the political thicket. In Reynolds v. Sims, 0
together with five companion cases,5 1 and others,5 2 the Court an-
45. 369 U.S. 186, 254 (1962). Frankfurter, J., dissented, including a long treatise
on the historical evolution of legislative apportionment, both in Great Britain and in
America, and noting that large discrepancies in regard to population strength in leg-
islative districts always existed; but he touched very little on the political doctrine issue.
Id. at 301-24.
46. See note 4 supra.
47. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
48. CORTNER, supra note 16, at 151-55.
49. Baker v. Carr, 296 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). For a summary of
what happened in each state as a result of the Supreme Court's decision of Baker v.
Cart, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), see R. McKAY, REAPPORTiONmmNT: TaE LAw AND PoLi-
TICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 275-458 (1965).
50. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado);
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678
(1964) (Virginia); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York).
52. Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964) (Iowa); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S.
564 (1964) (Connecticut); Hearne v. Smylie, 378 U.S. 563 (1964) (Idaho); Marshall
v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964) (Michigan); Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964)
(Illinois); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964) (Oklahoma); Nolan v. Rhodes, 378
U.S. 556 (1964) (Ohio); Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964) (Washington);
Swann v. Adams, 378 US. 553 (1964) (Florida).
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nounced a broad policy decision that both houses of a bicameral state
legislature s must be apportioned substantially a population basis.5"
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority of the Court in Reynolds,
stated: "We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral
state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis."55
Previously at least one house of some state legislatures had been
apportioned on an other than population basis. 56 Typical of this was
the assignment of one legislator per county for the upper house.57 A
popular analogy had been drawn between the United States Senate
with a fixed number of members from each state and the upper house
of the various state legislatures.5" It was reasoned, by this analogy,
that the states could easily justify such an assignment. The Court in
Reynolds rejected this comparison by stating that local units of govern-
ment are not sovereign entities, as are the various states. Chief Jus-
tice Warren noted that "[p]olitical subdivisions . . . counties, cities
or whatever-never were and never have been considered as sover-
eign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as
53. Forty-nine of the fifty states have a two house (bicameral) legislature. Ne-
braska has a one house (unicameral) legislature.
54. A voters' suit under the Civil Rights Act, supra note 33, had been brought
in the Middle District of Alabama shortly before the decision of Baker v. Carr. After
this decision, the Alabama state legislature decided to reapportion, but the resulting
plan included great variance in population among the several districts for both houses
of the legislature. Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 440-41, (M.D. Ala. 1962).
55. 377 U.S. at 568.
56. Population was the basis for apportioning both houses of the legislature in
Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as the one house legislature in Nebraska. In addi-
tion, population was the basis for apportioning the seats of the lower houses of the
legislatures of the states of California, Illinois, and Montana. The upper houses in
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, and Utah were apportioned according to population. Population with
weighted ratios was used to apportion the upper house of the legislature of Oregon,
and the lower houses of the legislatures of Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, and Oregon. Population and area were considered in the apportionment of
the lower house of the Connecticut legislature, and both the California and Florida
upper houses. An assignment of a representative to an established unit (e.g. county)
was used to apportion the lower house of Vermont, as well as the upper houses of
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and South Carolina.
Fixed constitutional apportionment existed in both houses of the legislature of Dela-
ware, as well as in the upper houses of Arkansas, Michigan, and Hawaii. Finally,
the senate districts of New Hampshire were apportioned on the basis of direct taxes
paid. G. BLrIm, AMERICAN LEGISLATuRES: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 80-83 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as BLAIR].
57. E.g., New Mexico. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
58. The United States is a union of sovereign states. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, §§
3-4, amend. X. Counties, however, are mere creatures of the state, authorized by the
respective state constitutions. See, e.g., CAr.. CONsT. art. XI, § 1.
Spring 19741 LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State."5 9
The Court reasoned that, unless both houses of a state legislature were
apportioned according to population, each voter's vote would be de-
based, which would be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
chief justice noted that "an individual's right to vote for state legis-
lators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial
fashion diluted when, compared with votes of citizens living in other
parts of the State." 60
Another decision in the 1964 Term of the Court, Lucas v. Forty-
fourth General Assembly,6' affirmed the ruling of Reynolds that both
houses of a state legislature must be apportioned according to popu-
lation. The voters of Colorado had approved a referendum which ap-
portioned the upper house of the state legislature on the basis of pop-
ulation, together with other criteria. The district court had sustained
the apportionment plan, holding that population was recognized as a
prime factor in the plan, that the other criteria used served a rational
state purpose, and that the "popular will of the People" had been
exercised by the referendum. 62  The Supreme Court disagreed and
stated that the plan did not meet the population test of Reynolds.
Chief Justice Warren stated:
We hold that the fact that a challenged legislative apportionment
plan was approved by the electorate is without federal constitu-
tional significance, if the scheme adopted fails to satisfy the basic
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, as delineated in our
opinion of Reynolds v. Sims. 63
Trail Blazing Throught the Political Thicket
In the same term, the Supreme Court extended the one man,
one vote rule to congressional apportionment. In a case from Geor-
gia, Wesberry v. Sanders,64 with Justice Black writing for the majority,
the Court stated that under the Constitution "the command of Art. 1 § 2,
that Representatives to be chosen 'by the People of the several States'
means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional
59. 377 U.S. at 575. See also BLAne, supra note 56, at 92-4; McKay, The Fed-
eral Analogy and State Apportionment Standards, 18 NoTRE DAME LAw. 487 (1963).
60. 377 U.S. at 568.
61. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
62. Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922 (D. Colo. 1963).
63. 377 U.S. at 737.
64. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Between 1872 and 1929, Congress required that mem-
bers of the House of Representatives be elected from districts as nearly equal in regard
to population as possible. Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11 § 2, 17 Stat. 28. This was
abandoned in 1929. Act of Jun. 18, 1929, ch. 28 § 22(a) (3), 46 Stat. 26. In 1932
the Court in Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S., 1 (1932), dismissed a suit involving the redis-
tricting of congressional districts. Colegrove v. Green, 329 U.S. 549 (1946), also in-
volved congressional districts and the Court disposed of it in a like manner.
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election is to be worth as much as another's."65  In the 1969 case
of Kirkpatrick v. Priesler,66 together with a companion decision,67 the
Court stated that each variance in regard to population in a congres-
sional district must be justified and that no arbitrary cutoff point ex-
ists at which a deviation can be said to be de minimis.6 8 In Wells
v. Rockefeller,69 decided on the same day, the majority of the Court
held that congressional districts must be divided as equally as possible,
using the whole state as the starting point.70  In 1973 these rulings
were again affirmed. The Court voided a congressional aiiportion-
ment plan from Texas in White v. Weiser71 because the districts were
not mathematically as equal as reasonably possible in regard to popula-
tion. 72
One Man, One Vote at the Local Level
In 1968, the Court in effect completed the implementation of
the "one man, one vote" principle in Avery v. Midland County.7  It
was announced that there could be no deviation from the population
standard set forth in Reynolds in the apportionment of local units of
government which possess any semblance of a legislative function.
The Midland County (Texas) Commissioners' Court possessed in the
words of the Supreme Court "general governmental powers over the
entire geographical area served by the body. ' 74  The Court viewed
with disfavor the Supreme Court of Texas' holding that criteria other
than population could be considered in the apportionment of the dis-
tricts from which the members of the local governing body were
elected. 5
In 1970, this ruling was refined in Hadley v. Junior Col-
lege Dist.,"6 which involved apportionment of seats for the local junior
college school board of Kansas City, Missouri. The majority of the
Court, Justice Black writing, held that the popular election of persons
to perform public functions requires proportional districting under the
65. 376 U.S. at 7-8.
66. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
67. Heinkel v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526(1969).
68. 394 U.S. at 530-3 1.
69. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
70. Brennan, J., writing for the majority, stated that "[tlhe general command, of
course, is to equalize population in all the districts of the State and is not satisfied
by equalizing population only within defined sub-states." 394 U.S. at 546.
71. 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
72. Id. at 790.
73. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
74. Id. at 485.
75. Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966).
76. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
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authority of Reynolds.77 The Missouri Supreme Court had dismissed
the case, stating -that the "one man, one vote' principle did not apply.78
The Supreme Court reasoned that such powers as levying and collect-
ing taxes, issuing bonds with certain restrictions, and hiring and firing
teachers were sufficient governmental powers so as to allow the deci-
sion of Avery v. Midland County7 9 to justify the ruling in this case.80
Chief Justice Warren stated upon his retirement from the Su-
preme Court in 1969 that he considered the apportionment rulings
to be the major decisions of his era. 81 Previously in many states polit-
ical power had resided with a minority. Now it had been returned
to the "grass roots" level. The Court in essence was faced with the
problem of returning the control of the, legislatures to the general pop-
ulation. The apportionment decisions established the principle that
the federal courts can exercise jurisdiction in malapportionment
cases.8" Consequently if a legislature fails to reapportion according
to constitutional directives,' voters in that state may invoke judicial
machinery to effect reapportionment. Therefore the legislatures have
been forced to reapportion as mandated, as failure to do so may result
in the courts performing the task. 4 The transformation of this poli-
tical85 question a judicial one certainly ranks as one of the great achieve-
ments of the Warren Court.
Ventures Into the Heart of the Political Thicket
Substantial Population
The majority opinion in Reynolds also stated that criteria other
than population might be taken into account in the apportionment
77. Id. at 52.
78. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 432 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Mo. 1968).
79. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
80. 397 U.S. at 53-4. See also Phoenix v Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970);
Cipriano v. City of Mouma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621 (1969). Cf. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist.,
410 U.S. 719 (1973), in which the Court held that a water district, which exists for the
purpose of acquiring and distributing water for farming, need not grant the franchise
to all that resided in its boundaries. The Court distinguished this case from the hold-
ing of Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), by stating that even though
the district did possess some limited governmental powers, it possessed relatively limited
authority and provided none of the general public services attributed to a governing
body. 410 U.S. at 726-29.
81. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1969, at 17, col. 6.
82. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
83. See note 13 supra.
84. Cf. Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal. 3d 396, 516 P.2d 6, 110 Cal. Rptr.
718 (1973). The California state legislature failed to reapportion according to the con-
stitutional mandates. CAL. CONsT. art IV, § 6. The California Supreme Court eventu-
ally appointed a panel of special masters who reapportioned the legislature. See also
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plan, provided 15opulation remained the prime criterion. Chief Jus-
tice Warren noted that
[slomewhat more flexibility may . . . be constitutionally permis-
sible with respect to state legislative apportionment than in con-
gressional districting .... So long as the divergences from a strict
population standard are based on legitimate considerations inci-
dent to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations
from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible
with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of
the two houses of a bicameral state legislature. 86
The chief justice, however, did not define what might be the permis-
sible numerical deviation from the population norm allowed, nor did
he give any idea as to what might constitute a rational state policy.
A minority of the Court in Reynolds felt that some other basis
than population should be considered in the apportionment of one
house of a state legislature.87  Justice Clark stated that
if one house of the State Legislature meets the population stand-
ard, representation in the other house might include some depar-
ture from it so as to take into account, on a rational basis, other
factors in order -to afford some representation to the various ele-
ments of the State.8
Unfortunately, Justice Clark did not elaborate what these rational cri-
teria might be.8 9
The first major state apportionment case90 to come before the
Supreme Court after the 1964 Term was Swann v. Adams.Y The
Florida legislature had adopted an apportionment plan, supposedly to
comply with Reynolds, which provided for a maximum population var-
Lerner, The Role of the State Judiciary in Redistricting and Reapportionment, 18
N.Y.U. INA. L. REV. 79 (1963).
85. See note 4 supra.
86. 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964).
87. Id. at 587-88 (Clark, J., concurring), and id. at 588-89 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring).
88. Id. at 588 (concurring opinion).
89. Harlan, J., dissented, stating that he felt that reapportionment is not within
the scope of judicial review and that the ruling of the majority of the Court failed
to take into account such factors as history, economic or other sorts of group interests,
area geographical considerations, a desire to insure effective representation for sparsely
settled areas, access of citizens to their representatives theories of bicameralism, occu-
pation, an attempt to balance urban and rural power, and the preference of the major-
ity of the voters of the state. 377 U.S. at 589-632.
90. The case of Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), from Hawaii, held that
the population test of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) applied to the redistrict-
ing of a state legislature. In addition there were three per curian affirmances of lower
court apportionment decisions on state legislatures. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 269
(1966) (Wyoming); Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965) (Virginia); Forty-fourth
General Assembly v. Lucas, 379 U.S. 693 (1965) (Colorado).
91. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
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iance of 25.65 per cent and 33.55 per cent in the upper and lower
houses of the legislature, respectively. The district court sustained the
plan as substantially taking into account the population criterion es-
tablished in Reynolds, and furthering a rational state purpose in re-
gard to the population deviations. 92 Justice White, writing for the ma-
jority of the Court, stated:
As this case comes to us we have no alternative but to reverse.
The District Court made no attempt to explain or justify the many
variations among the legislative districts. As for the State, all it
suggested in either the lower court or here is that its plan comes
as close as "practical" to complete population equality and that
the State was attempting to follow congressional district lines.
There was, however, no attempt to justify any particular devia-
tions, even the larger ones, with respect to either of these consid-
erations. 93
He further stated that "[dle minimis deviations are unavoidable, but
variations of 30% among senate districts and 40% among house dis-
trict can hardly be deemed de minimis . . . .- The case squarely
placed the burden of proof on the states to articulate acceptable rea-
sons for any deviations from the population standard which might be
allowed under the authority of Reynolds.
In Kilgarlin v. Hill,95 decided in the same term, the Court in
a per curiam opinion stated that a deviation of 26.48 per cent in the
apportionment of the Texas House of Representatives was not accept-
able, but remanded the case to the district court for further considera-
tion in light of the burden of proof standard articulated in Swann.9"
Relaxed One Man, One Vote Rule
Abate v. Mundt97 saw the Court begin to deviate from the "one
man, one vote" principle of Reynolds. The Court allowed an 11.9
per cent deviation in the apportionment scheme for the county legis-
lature of Rockland County, New York. The smallest town in the
county was the basis for the plan, which took into account the over-
lapping city-county governmental functions in which the county legisla-
ture participated. The Court apparently gave recognition to political
boundaries as a rational state criterion for allowing some deviation in
population under the authority of Reynolds. The Court did not, how-
ever, explicitly state this, and tied the decision narrowly to the facts
of the case.98
92. Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
93. 385 U.S. at 445.
94. Id. at 444.
95. 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
96. Id. at 122.
97. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
98. Id. at 187.
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Abate v. Mundt99 was decided only six months after Hadley v.
Junior College Dist.,00 in which no deviation from the population
standard in regard to apportionment of a local body with quasi-govern-
mental powers was allowed. Why did the Court suddenly allow a
population deviation in an apportionment scheme? The Court stated
in Abate v. Mundt'01 that "[w]e emphasize that our decision is based
on the long tradition of overlapping functions and dual personnel in
Rockland County government and on the fact that the plan before
us does not contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular political
interests or geographic areas.' 0 2  The Junior College District of Kan-
sas City, Missouri, had been apportioned according to the number of
individuals in the district between the ages of six and twenty years
with a resulting population deviation greater than that permitted in
Abate.10 3 The Court did not distinguish Hadley or offer any reason
why Abate might have been different.
In 1973 an even greater population deviation in an apportion-
ment plan was allowed. In Mahan v. Howell, 04 together with two
companion cases,' 05 the Court allowed a maximum population devia-
tion of 16.4 per cent'0 6 in the apportionment plan for the lower house
of the Virginia state legislature (the House of Delegates), resulting
from a state policy of respecting the traditional political boundaries
of the state.10 7  The majority of the Court apparently felt that this
was a rational state policy that justified such a high population devia-
tion. The majority opinion failed to distinguish this case from pre-
vious rulings and did not offer any justification for the population de-
viation allowed. A minority of the Court stated that the states could
have more leeway in the apportionment of their respective legislatures,
but felt that the bounds of permissible deviation had been exceeded
in this case. 0 8
99. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
100. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
101. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
102. Id. at 187.
103. 397 U.S. at 51.
104. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
105. City of Virginia Beach v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Weinberg v. Prich-
ard, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
106. Brennan, J., in a partial dissent, noted that the record was unclear as to the
maximum population deviation and that it might have been 23.6 per cent. 410 U.S.
at 336.
107. The Court, however, upheld the district court's invalidation of a section of
the apportionment plan which counted all U.S. Naval personnel "homeported" at the
Norfolk Naval Base as residing there regardless of where they in fact resided. Howell
v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1971). The Court felt that there was no
rational basis for this classification. 410 U.S. at 330-33. This would amount to dis-
crimination against military personnel. Accord, Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
108. 410 U.S. at 343-44.
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Two additional cases in 1973 also allowed the states to have more
leeway in the apportionment of their respective legislatures. In Gaff-
ney v. Cummings,10 9 the Court allowed a maximum population devia-
tion of 1.81 per cent and 7.83 per cent for the upper and lower houses
respectively in an apportionment plan for the Connecticut legislature.
A three judge federal court had invalidated the plan as repugnant to
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."" Towns,
rather than counties, constitute the basic unit of local government in
Connecticut. No town was divided in the apportionment scheme,
since such a division would be prohibited under the state constitu-
tion.-" The Court felt that this should be allowed in the interest
of "political fairness"," 2 although Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, did not explicitly define this term.
A companion case, White v. Regester,"3 allowed a maximum
population deviation of 9.9 per cent in an apportionment plan for the
Texas state legislature, although the Court did not explicitly state why
this was being allowed." 4 The Court, however, upheld the ruling
of a lower federal court" 5 invalidating a provision in the plan for
multi-member districts" 6 in both Bexar and Dallas counties because
of the historic discrimination against Mexican and black Americans
in these counties." 7
The question must also be raised as to whether changes in the
personnel of the Court brought about the current trend of decisions.
In Hadley v. Junior College Dist.," 8 Justices Harlan and Stewart, to-
gether with Chief Justice Burger, dissented. Justices Black, Brennan,
Douglas, Fortas, Marshall, and White constituted the majority. In
Abate v. Mundt," 9 Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented. They
had previously been in the ranks of the majority in Hadley. Two
of the dissenters in Hadley, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart,
joined the ranks of the majority in Abate, and Justice Harlan, another
109. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
110. Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F. Supp. 139 (D. Conn. 1972).
111. CONN. ONST. art. III, § 4.
112. 412 U.S. at 752-53.
113. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
114. The Court, however, did cite Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
as controlling. 412 U.S. at 764.
115. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
116. A multi-member district is one in which more than one person is elected to
the same legislative body to represent the district at large.
117. The Court noted that multi-member districts are not per se unconstitutional,
but in this case upheld the invalidation of their use in the apportionment plan, because
of this historic discrimination. 412 U.S. at 765-70. Accord, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
118. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
119. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
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dissenter in Hadley, concurred in the result. Justice Fortas was no
longer on the Court when Abate was decided. Justice Blackmun, a
new member of the Court, joined the majority in this case. Justices
Marshall, Black, and White, in the majority in Hadley, also joined the
ranks of the majority in Abate.
In Mahan v. Howell, 20 Justice Marshall, a member of the major-
ity in Abate, joined with Justices Brennan and Douglas who dissented
in Abate, in a partial dissent. One new member of the Court, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, wrote the majority opinion. Justice Powell, also a new
member of the Court, did not take part in this decision. He, however,
joined the majority in Gaffney v. Cummings' 2' and White v. Regis-
ter. 2 2  In 1973, Justices Black and Harlan were no longer on the
Court, both having died in 1971. Justice Black had sided with the
majority in Hadley and Abate; and Justice Harlan dissented in Hadley
and only concurred in the result of Abate. Some might attribute the
trend of the new rulings to the new personnel on the Court; others
might argue that the fact situations presented in the new cases brought
about the rulings.
The Future
At the present juncture, the Supreme Court has adopted a diver-
gent approach to the issue of apportionment. No deviation from the
"one man, one vote" principle has been allowed in the apportionment
of congressional districts.'2 3 A deviation up to 16.4 per cent in popu-
lation in the apportionment plan of a state legislature has been al-
lowed' 24 under the substantial population ruling of Reynolds. What
does the future hold for apportionment, federal, state, and local?
Congressional Apportionment
In regard to congressional apportionment, the decisions of the
Court emphatically state that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution
mandates congressional districts be apportioned as equally as possible
in regard to population, 1 5 using the whole state as the starting point
in the process. 12 6 The Court, on the practical side, fully realizes that
absolute numerical equality is impossible to achieve, so it places the
burden on the states to show that a good faith attempt has been made
120. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
121. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
122. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
123. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964).
124. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
125. E.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
126. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
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to achieve mathematical equality. 127
Furthermore, the Court has separated state apportionment from
congressional apportionment. In Reynolds the Court stated that
"Gray and Wesberry are of course not dispositive of or directly con-
trolling on our decision in these cases involving state legislative reap-
portionment controversies."'1 28  Despite this language, the district
court in Howell v. Mahan1 29 relied on Wesberry v. Sanders 30 and sub-
sequent congressional apportionment decisions' 8 ' to justify their ruling
in regard to the Virginia state apportionment scheme. The district
court did not argue by analogy from these cases, but simply cited them
as controlling in the controversy before the court1 32  The Supreme
Court clearly stated that these cases did not apply to state apportion-
ment controveries.' 33  Since the decision of the district court had al-
lowed some deviation in regard to population in the apportionment
scheme under the authority of Reynolds, the Supreme Court distin-
guished these congressional apportionment cases from the state cases
by noting that no rational state purpose could be achived by deviation
from numerical equality in congressional apportionment. 4  Thus, the
Supreme Court expressly separates the issue of congressional appor-
tionment from state and local apportionment.
State and Local Legislatures
The trend of cases in the area of state and local apportionment
is not as clear. When does the deviation of population become too
greast for acceptance by the Court under the substantial population
test of Reynolds? What are legitimate state interests? Can a certain
legitimate state interest justify a greater population deviation than an-
other?
Two possibilities appear as to the direction the Court will take
in regard to the substantial population test of Reynolds. The first
is to draw a line beyond which population deviation will violate this
test. Where the Court desires to draw this is entirely unknown. In
previous apportionment decisions, the Court had overruled deviations
127. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
128. 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964).
129. 330 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1971).
130. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
131. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526 (1969).
132. 330 F. Supp. at 1139.
133. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320 (1973).
134. Id. at 322.
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of 26.48,135 25.65,136 and 33.55 per cent.137  But departures from
strict numerical equality by 11.9,138 7.83,11" and 9.9140 per cent have
been allowed. In Mahan the Court approved a deviation of 16.4 per
cent.14 None of these decisions have given any indication of an arbi-
trary point at which the Court might state that the deviation-is too
great to meet the substantial population test of Reynolds. In addition
the Court has failed to decide whether a "balancing test" might be
used in apportionment cases; that is, whether the percentage of popu-
lation deviation permitted depends on what reasons are offered to jus-
tify it.
The second possibility is that the Court will overrule the specific
holding of Reynolds that requires both houses of a state (and local)
legislature be apportioned on substantially a population basis, but re-
tain the portion of Reynolds that requires that the criteria used in an
apportionment plan meet the test of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and that they serve a legitimate state pur-
pose.
Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no person will be
denied the equal protection of the laws by any state. A group of
people do not necessarily have to be "equal in numbers". Grouls
are formed according to classifications. A common interest unites a
group. "The principle of proportional . . . equality does take cog-
nizance of differences among men and may require numerically differ-
ent treatment because of those differences."'1 42  The difference of
each group must be real and not just illusory. One method of discern-
ing whether a group is real is to decide whether they possess a com-
mon interest. This is obviously a subjective judgment at best. 43  In
many cases, the decision is apt to be arbitrary, even though arrived
at by the use of formulated best evidence criteria. Once a common
group is established, it must be scrutinized to see if it contains "all
135. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
136. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
137. Id.
138. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 186 (1971).
139. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
140. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
141. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
142. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAIv. L. RFv. 1065,
1166 (1969).
143. For a discussion of the use of language, see J. WILSoN, LANGUAGE AND THE
PtJrsurr OF TRauH (1967).
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persons who are similarly situated in respect to the purj5ose of the
law."1' 44
The question must be asked as to what the other criteria might
be. Urban and rural groups could be considered such a criterion.
Viewed in the abstract it is quite possible that a state could show that
each of these groups possessed special interests that could be made
known by the use of proportional representation. Exactly what these
criteria of justification might be remains a speculative matter. The
Court should review such proposed criteria very critically under the
standards of -the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, specifically making sure that the reality of the classification has
been established and that each group similarly situated is equally rep-
resented.'45
State Interests
In Mahan, Justice Rehnquist stated that "the legislature's plan
for apportionment of the House of Delegates may reasonably be said
to advance the rational state policy of respecting the boundaries of
political subdivisions."' 4 6  But the only justification offered by the
Court for this pronouncement was that the people of Virginia had
delegated the power to enact local legislation to the legislature. The
Court stated:
We are not prepared to say that the decision of the people of
Virginia to grant the General Assembly the power to enact local
legislation dealing with the political subdivisions is irrational. And
if that be so, the decision of the General Assembly to provide
representation to subdivisions qua subdivisions in order to imple-
ment that constitutional power is likewise valid when measured
against the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.147
The Court in this case advanced no other reason for its decision
to accept traditional political boundaries as rational state criteria. In-
deed it appears that the majority uncritically has established the legiti-
macy of political subdivisions as a rational state interest. No particular
reason was advanced by the Court other than the delegation by the
people of Virginia of power to enact local legislation to the state legis-
144. Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALw. L. REV.
341, 346 (1949).
145. See generally Israel, Nonpopulation Factors Relevant to an Acceptable Stand-
ard of Apportionment, 38 NOTRE DAm LAw. 499 (1963); and Laughlin, Proportional
Representation It Can Cure Our Apportionment Ills, 49 A.B.A.J. 1065 (1963). This
also raises the question of how representation is exactly defined. See generally, H.
PrrmaN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
146. 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973).
147. Id. at 325-26.
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lature. The Court did not justify why they used this as the reason
for approving political subdivisions as a legitimate state interest in this
case. Mahan would appear to be contrary to the ruling in Swann v.
Adams,14 which requires that the state present acceptable criteria for
rational state purposes used in alportionment plans. Mahan suggests
that the Court will accept any criteria, without much examination to
see whether the criteria advanced are "acceptable" under the test of
Swann v. Adams,149 and will apply the particular fact situation to the
particular apportionment plan.
In Abate v. Mundt, 50 the rational state interest advanced to jus-
tify the deviation from a strict population standard was -the historical
dual function performed by the county legislature. The smallest town
in Rockland County was used as the starting point for the apportion-
ment plan. Although the Court in this case did not call this criterion
a political subdivision, it appears that it should have been labeled as
such, since towns themselves are political creations of the state. In
this case the Court very uncritically accepted this criterion as a rational
state policy, without an examination of it under the particular fact
situation of the case.
Political subdivisions were also advanced as rational state policy
in Gaffney v. Cummings.'51 Towns constitute the basic unit of gov-
ernment in Connecticut and no town was divided in the apportionment
plan because such a division would have violated the state constitu-
tion.' 52 In addition, the majority opinion of the Court also stated that
the apportionment plan should be allowed in the interest of "political
fairness", 58 although the Court did not even offer any justification
for this as a rational state purpose, and furthermore, it did not give
a definition of this term. On its face this criterion appears to be
ambiguous at best.
The lack of precision by the Court in defining what constitutes
a legitimate state interest, a failure to formulate a set of criteria by
which it could be ascertained whether a proposed classification might
constitute a legitimate state interest, and the uncritical acceptance of
political subdivisions and policial fairness as legitimate state criteria
make arrival at a legitimate apportionment plan difficult. In addition
to these omissions, the Court fails to provide to the lower federal
courts, the forums which will initially hear any challenges to state ap-
148. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
149. Id.
150. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
151. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
152. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 4.
153. 412 U.S. at 752-53.
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portionment plans at the federal level, adequate guidelines on which
to base a decision.
Summary
At one time apportionment was considered to be a "political"' 1
question, and the courts refrained from intervention in its domain, 55
even though they recognized that malapportionment did exist. Baker
v. Carr56 established the jurisdiction of the federal courts in appor-
tionment controversies. The Court later held that congressional dis-
tricts must be apportioned on a population basis with no deviation per-
mitted. 57  In Reynolds v. Sims,'58 the Court announced that both
houses of a state legislature must be apportioned on substantially a
population basis, but with some deviation allowed in cases where the
state desires to give effect to a legitimate interest, provided that popu-
lation remains the prime criterion.' 59  The Reynolds rule later was
extended to local popularly elected bodies possessing quasi-legislative
authority. 160
The substantial population rule of Reynolds v. Sims'6' has created
a line of extremely difficult cases for the Court. Some deviation from
the population standard in regard to the apportionment of state legis-
latures and local governing bodies has been allowed.' 6 The Court
has yet to indicate the maximum deviation that is allowable under Rey-
nolds. The Court further has failed to define what exactly constitutes
a "legitimate state interest" and has uncritically accepted the criteria
of "political subdivisions"'68 and "political fairness"'", as such inter-
ests. Also unanswered is whether certain legitimate state interests
would permit a greater population deviation than others. The possi-
bility also remains that the Court might altogether abandon the sub-
stantial population standard of Reynolds and allow at least one house
of a state legislature (or even a local governing body) to be appor-
tioned on a basis other than population. If this were allowed, what
criteria could be used which would not violate the equal protection
154. See note 4 supra.
155. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
156. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
157. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
158. 377 U.S. 533 (10 (1964).
159. Id. at 578-79.
160. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
161. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
162. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182
(1971).
163. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
164. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Can objective criteria be ad-
vanced by the proponents of such a plan?
The Court is presently at a critical juncture in cases involving
the apportionment of state legislatures and local governing bodies. It
desires to give recognition to the principles of federalism and allow
the states more leeway in the apportionment of their respective legisla-
tures and local governing bodies.' 65  The Court has failed to articu-
late, however, exactly how far states may deviate from the population
standard and exactly what constitute "legitimate state interests". This
task remains for the future, as a challenge the Court must undoubtedly
accept.
165. Cf. Mahan v. HoweU, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).

